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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                                 
 
 
McKee, Circuit Judge. 
  
 We are asked to decide, among other things, if a seaman's 
failure to disclose a prior injury on a job application causes 
the seaman to forfeit his entitlement to maintenance and cure.  
We hold that, under the circumstances presented here, no such 
forfeiture has occurred and we will thus affirm the district 
court's judgment.  
  I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 McCormack Aggregates, Co. operates various dredging vessels 
in connection with its business of mining sand from the bottom of 
the sea.  Francis Deisler is a seaman who is a member of 
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 25 - Marine 
Division.  That union periodically refers workers to employers 
who operate dredging vessels and equipment.  In 1982, Deisler 
injured his back while he was working on a dredge and he was 
disabled for about six months.  Thereafter, he returned to jobs 
  
involving heavy physical labor including construction work, 
dockbuilding and dredging.   
 On August 3, 1988, while Deisler was working as a dredgeman 
for another boating company, his union referred him to McCormack 
where he filled out an application for a position as a boatman.  
That application included the following question: "Do you have 
any physical limitations which would hinder your performance in 
the position applied for?"  Deisler did not answer the question.1 
 On June 12, 1989, some 10-1/2 months after he filled out the 
application, Deisler's union told him to report for work with 
McCormack on June 13.2  Deisler's application apparently was 
never reviewed.  The sections on the bottom portion of the 
application labelled "Reviewed By" and "Approved By," which were 
for "office use only," were left blank.   
                     
1
  Although there was some dispute at trial about Deisler's prior 
injury, Deisler offered testimony that he had been pain free for 
three years prior to filling out the job application.  It is 
undisputed that Dr. Edward Taylor, an orthopedic surgeon, treated 
Deisler for a herniated disk at L3-4 in 1985, and prescribed 
medication and exercise.  Thereafter Deisler's condition improved 
and he resumed work as a manual laborer.    
 
 Deisler testified that when he filled out the job 
application, he believed he had no physical limitation which 
would hinder his job performance with McCormack.   
2
  The district court's Findings of Fact state that Deisler 
reported for work on June 14, 1989.  April 26, 1994, Findings of 
Fact, ¶ 4.  However, that appears to be an error.  Deisler's 
uncontroverted trial testimony is that he received the call to 
report to work on Monday, June 12, 1989 and he reported the next 
day.  See Suppl. App. at 4 (Deisler's trial testimony).   
  
 Deisler was injured almost immediately after he began 
working for McCormack.  The district court described the incident 
which caused his injury as follows: 
  On June 15, 1989, . . . plaintiff suffered an 
injury while moving a wheelbarrow loaded with 
supplies along a path on McCormack's 
property.  This job had been assigned to him 
by his supervisors, Messrs. Ellis and 
Melendez, who were, respectively, the 
tugboat's Captain, and the dredge's 
Dragtender . . . .  The accident occurred 
when he [Deisler] rolled the wheelbarrow off 
the vessel side of the ramp, and the 
wheelbarrow's wheel went onto the sandy path. 
The wheelbarrow became unstable, stopped 
short, and fell onto its side, spilling its 
contents.  Plaintiff's forward momentum 
caused him to tumble and fall over the 
stopped wheelbarrow.  Immediately after his 
fall he felt a sharp pain in his back. 
 
April 26, 1994, Findings of Fact, ¶ 5. 
 The district court found that Melendez and Ellis saw this 
incident.3  Both were in the dredge's dragtender's cabin which 
was a raised work platform which overlooked the location where 
Deisler fell.  Melendez testified that Ellis ducked down when 
Deisler fell so that Deisler would not know that Ellis had 
witnessed the accident, and that Ellis told him (Melendez) that 
he had seen Deisler fall.   
 The following morning Ellis asked Deisler to move some heavy 
cables, but Deisler complained that his back was hurting.  
Deisler then left the vessel, went to the company's offices, and 
                     
3
  Melendez testified at trial that he saw the aftermath.  
  
began filling out an accident report of his fall and the 
resulting back injury.  Deisler then went to the office next door 
where he was given a dismissal notice which stated that he was 
being fired for unsatisfactory work performance.   
 Before Deisler left McCormack's offices, he took a New 
Jersey Disability Benefits claim form that he sent to his 
physician.  Deisler's physician completed that form and returned 
it to McCormack after June 27, 1989.  Thereafter, Deisler made a 
claim for maintenance and cure, and McCormack hired the maritime 
investigative firm of Lamorte and Burns, Inc. to investigate that 
claim.  Lamorte was succeeded by American Maritime Consultants.4  
Following the investigation of Deisler's claim, both Lamorte and 
American Maritime recommended that McCormack pay Deisler the 
requested maintenance and cure, but McCormack refused and Deisler 
filed suit against McCormack and its dredge under the Jones Act,5 
and under general maritime law. 
  Those two causes of action were tried simultaneously with 
the jury sitting as the finder of fact on the Jones Act claim and 
the court sitting as finder of fact on the general maritime 
claim.  The jury found the defendants were not negligent and 
                     
4
  Bernard Lillis, McCormack's Chief Financial Officer also 
investigated Deisler's claim.  Lillis delegated some of the 
investigation to Brad Simek, McCormack's Dredge Superintendent 
who oversaw the operations of the dredge and its crew. 
5
  The Jones Act provides in part that "[a]ny seaman who shall 
suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at 
his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the 
right of jury trial, . . . ."  46 U.S.C. § 688. 
  
returned a verdict in their favor under the Jones Act.  However, 
the district court granted plaintiff's motion for a new trial on 
the Jones Act claim but plaintiff elected to discontinue that 
cause of action in favor of his claim for maintenance and cure, 
and also for compensatory damages, under the general maritime 
law.  The court ruled that plaintiff was entitled to maintenance 
and cure under general maritime law, and also awarded plaintiff 
compensatory damages based upon defendants' arbitrary and 
capricious denial of plaintiff's claim.  The defendants6 appeal 
from this judgment of the district court.    
II. DISCUSSION 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over this 
admiralty action under 28 U.S.C. § 1333.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction over the final judgment of the district court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the district court's 
findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard.  See Sheet 
Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local 19 v. 2300 Group, Inc., 949 F.2d 
1274, 1278 (3d Cir. 1991).  However, our review of the district 
court's application of the law to these facts is plenary.  See 
Tudor Dev. Group v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 968 F.2d 
357, 359 (3d Cir. 1992). 
     A. Maintenance and Cure 
 The gravamen of McCormack's argument is that Deisler 
forfeited his right to maintenance and cure when he failed to 
                     
6
  Hereinafter both defendants will be referenced as "McCormack." 
  
disclose his prior back injury as requested on the employment 
application.  
 Maintenance and cure are rights given to seamen who become 
ill or injured in the service of a vessel.7  "Maintenance is the 
living allowance for a seaman while he is ashore recovering from 
injury or illness.  See Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531, 
82 S.Ct. 997, 1000, 8 L.Ed.2d 88 (1962).  Cure is payment of 
medical expenses incurred in treating the seaman's injury or 
illness.  See Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528, 58 
S.Ct. 651, 653, 82 L.Ed. 993 (1938)."  Barnes v. Andover Co. 
L.P., 900 F.2d 630, 633 (3d Cir. 1990).  An employer's obligation 
to furnish maintenance and cure continues "until the seaman has 
reached the point of maximum cure, that is until the seaman is 
cured or his condition is diagnosed as permanent and incurable."  
Barnes, 900 F.2d at 633-34; see also Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 
U.S. 1, 5 (1975). 
 The origins of the duty to provide maintenance and cure have 
been traced to Justice Story in Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 
482-83 (C.C.D. Me. 1823).8  The Supreme Court first recognized 
and defined these rights in The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 
                     
7
  It is undisputed that Deisler is a maritime employee who would 
normally be entitled to maintenance and cure. 
8
  For a discussion of the historical underpinnings and evolution 
of a seaman's right to maintenance and cure see Cox v. Dravo 
Corp., 517 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1975). 
  
(1903).9  "The duty was derived from medieval maritime codes," 
Barnes, 900 F.2d at 633, and is interpreted in such a way as to 
afford injured seamen the maximum protection of the law. 
                     
9
  In The Osceola, a crew member sued for injuries sustained in 
carrying out an order given by the master.  There was no 
allegation that the mate or the crew were negligent in their 
execution of the master's order.  Rather, plaintiff claimed that 
the vessel and its owners should be liable for the negligent 
order of the captain in the course of the navigation or 
management of the vessel.  189 U.S. at 159-60.  The district 
court held that the vessel was liable in rem for plaintiff's 
injuries, and the Circuit Court of Appeals certified certain 
questions of law to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court denied 
recovery.   
 
 The Court distilled the substance of the questions before it 
into the sole issue of whether the vessel owner was liable in rem 
to one of the crew by reason of the improvident and negligent 
order of the master.  The Court began its analysis by noting that 
for the district court's conclusion to be correct, the liability 
must be founded upon the general admiralty law or upon a local 
statute of the state in which the accident occurred.  Id. at 168.  
The Court then went on to examine the Continental codes and the 
American case law.  The Court reasoned that while the Continental 
codes had restricted seamen to the traditional remedy of 
maintenance and cure, the American cases, perhaps stimulated by 
the English Merchants Shipping Act of 1876, had allowed recovery 
of an "indemnity" for unseaworthiness.  However, these cases 
denied recovery for negligence in "navigation and management."  
Based on its review of these authorities, the Court opined: 
 
  That the seaman is not allowed to recover an 
indemnity for the negligence of the master, or any 
member of the crew, but is entitled to maintenance and 
cure, whether the injuries were received by negligence 
or accident. 
 
Id. at 175. 
 
 This proposition was undercut with the passing of the Jones 
Act, which provided that a seaman who is injured in the course of 
his employment by the negligence of the owner, master, or fellow 
crew members could recover damages for his injuries.  See Grant 
  
  Viewing seamen as wards of admiralty, the 
Court has emphasized that the right to 
maintenance and cure must be construed 
liberally and has consistently expanded the 
scope of the right.  Thus, today a shipowner 
is obliged to pay maintenance and cure 
regardless of any fault on its part; only 
wilful misconduct on the part of the seaman 
will deprive him of its protection. 
 
Id.  (citations omitted).  Although conditions have clearly 
changed since this concept was first introduced into law, the 
right of recovery for maintenance and cure has continued to be a 
fundamental component of the relationship between employees and 
employers at admiralty. 
  "[T]he seaman's right was firmly 
established in the maritime law long before 
recognition of the distinction between tort 
and contract." 
  [It is argued that] the rationale 
underlying the right of maintenance, which is 
predicated on the special status of seamen as 
"wards of the admiralty," is no longer valid. 
It is true that almost every case concerning 
the right to maintenance relies on Justice 
Story's description of the seaman as 
"generally poor and friendless, and 
acquir[ing] habits of gross indulgence, 
carelessness, and improvidence." 
  [It is also argued that] today those seamen 
who are unionized are neither friendless nor 
improvident . . . .  Furthermore, the 
adjectives "friendless" and "helpless" were 
generally used to describe sailors in foreign 
ports . . . . 
   The changed circumstances of the unionized 
seaman may undercut the rationale supporting 
the traditional right to maintenance and 
(..continued) 
Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty § 6-2, at 
276-277 (2d ed. 1975).        
 
        
  
cure, at least for unionized seamen.  
However, the Supreme Court has shown no 
inclination to depart from its long 
established solicitude for seamen.  Until it 
does so, we see no basis to assume that the 
emergence of powerful seamen's unions, . . . 
justifies our ignoring the Court's clear and 
frequent pronouncements that seamen remain 
wards of the admiralty. 
 
Id. at 636-37 (citations omitted). 
 A ship owner's responsibility for maintenance and cure 
"extends beyond injuries sustained on board ship or during 
working hours to any injuries incurred in any place while the 
seaman is subject to the call of duty."  Id. at 633; see also 
Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 732 (1943).  As noted 
above, only the seaman's willful misconduct or deliberate 
misbehavior relieves the ship operator of this duty.  See Barnes, 
900 F.2d at 633.10 
 1. Deisler's Failure to Disclose His Prior Injury 
 McCormack contends that Deisler's failure to disclose his 
prior back injury is the kind of misbehavior which relieves it of 
the duty it would otherwise have to provide maintenance and cure.  
However, nondisclosure of a pre-existing injury, without more, 
will not result in a seaman's loss of maintenance and cure.  Such 
a forfeiture will not occur unless Deisler intentionally 
misrepresented or concealed medical facts that were material to 
                     
10
  The duty to provide maintenance and cure is independent of 
any fault of the employer, and the seaman's contributory 
negligence does not affect his right to maintenance and cure.  
The Osceola, supra; Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 731.   
  
the decision to hire Deisler.  In addition, there must be a nexus 
between the improperly concealed material information and the 
disputed injury.  See McCorpen v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp., 
396 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 894 (1968) 
(where a seaman is required to provide pre-employment medical 
information and "the seaman intentionally misrepresents or 
conceals material medical facts, the disclosure of which is 
plainly desired, then he is not entitled to an award of 
maintenance and cure," if the injury is causally related to the 
concealed medical condition); Wactor v. Spartan  Transportation 
Corp., 27 F.3d 347, 352 (8th Cir. 1994) (adopting the McCorpen 
standard); Siders v. Ohio River Co., 469 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1972) 
(per curiam) (citing McCorpen).11  Given the historical 
importance of a seaman's claim for maintenance and cure, it 
                     
11
  In Sammon v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp., 442 F.2d 1028 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 881 (1971), the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit stated that the rule in McCorpen "that any 
concealment of material medical data, prevents an award for 
maintenance and cure is not the rule of this Circuit."  Id. at 
1029.  The Sammon court held that the concealment of a pre-
existing condition by the seaman during a pre-hiring interview 
"is fraudulent only if the seaman knows or reasonably should know 
that the concealed condition is relevant."  Id.  Under that rule, 
a seaman may claim maintenance and cure for a related injury or 
illness if, at the time he was asked, he held a good faith belief 
that the pre-existing condition was not relevant to his fitness 
for work.  Id.  Even if there is some tension between the rule of 
McCorpen and the rule of Sammon, see Wactor, 27 F.3d at 352 n.4, 
it is not relevant to this case, because, as discussed in the 
text, McCormack has not proven that Deisler's omission was 
material to its decision to hire him. 
 
  
should not be lost unless the employee's purportedly wrongful 
conduct was material to an employer's hiring decision.    
 The district court concluded that Deisler should have 
disclosed his prior injury in response to the inquiry on the 
employment application.  The court ruled that McCormack's inquiry 
into prior injuries created an inference that the information was 
material to McCormack.  The court went on to conclude, however, 
that this "inference" of materiality was destroyed by the fact 
that McCormack's decision to deny maintenance and cure was not 
predicated on the concealment but rather on McCormack's 
contention that an accident never happened.  Suppl. App. at 107-
08.  In Deisler's view, the district court found that the 
concealment was not material to McCormack's decision to hire 
Deisler.  But that clearly is not what the district court found.  
We thus view Deisler's materiality argument as an alternative 
argument for affirming the judgment.  Cf. Mark v. Borough of 
Hatboro, No. 94-1722, slip op. at 3 n.1 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 1995) 
("we can affirm on a ground which the district court did not rely 
but which was raised before it.").   
  Assuming arguendo that the question on McCormack's 
application created a duty to disclose,12 the record is 
                     
12
  McCormack argues that Deisler's failure to cross-appeal means 
that we must accept the district court's finding that Deisler 
should have disclosed that he could not perform the work as 
readily as others because of his prior back injury.  The argument 
is frivolous.  Of course, an appellee is entitled to rely on 
alternative arguments which had been raised in the district court 
supporting the judgment without filing a cross-appeal, so long as 
he or she is not seeking to expand his or her rights under the 
  
absolutely clear that Deisler's omission was not material to 
McCormack's hiring decision.  Deisler was never questioned about 
his failure to answer although McCormack had eleven months to 
review his job application before he was told to report for work.  
This is evidenced by the fact that the sections on the bottom 
portion of the application labelled "Reviewed By" and "Approved 
By" were left blank.  One of the investigators working for 
Lamorte stated:   
  I met with McCormack Aggregates, Mr. Brad 
Simek, to discuss the hiring of Mr. Deisler 
and specifically to find out if there was a 
policy or practice of questioning prospective 
employees about medical conditions, or if 
anyone could testify as to any conversations 
with Deisler that the back condition predated 
his employment with McCormack.  
Unfortunately, McCormack is unable to provide 
me with any such supporting testimony. 
 
Suppl. App. at 182.    
 McCormack argues that its failure to investigate Deisler's 
omission is irrelevant.  Reply Brief of Appellant at 4.  However, 
McCormack had the burden of proving that the omission was 
material to its decision to hire Deisler, see Wactor, 27 F.3d at 
352; Ruiz v. Plimsoll Marine, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 315, 317 (M.D. 
La. 1992), and its failure to do so is fatal to its assertion 
(..continued) 
judgment or limit another's rights.  See Mark v. Borough of 
Hatboro, No. 94-1722, slip op. at 3 n.1 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 1995).     
 
  
that Deisler is not now entitled to recover maintenance and 
cure.13  
B. Wages, Compensatory Damages, Prejudgment Interest, Attorney's 
Fees and Costs 
 
 McCormack argues that even if Deisler can recover 
maintenance and cure, the district court erred in awarding lost 
wages, damages for pain and suffering, prejudgment interest, 
costs, and attorney's fees, as those are not an incident of the 
seaman's contract of employment.14  McCormack asserts that these 
damages are an incident of negligence under the Jones Act and 
that since Deisler elected to dismiss his Jones Act claim after 
                     
13
  We reject McCormack's contention that we should, here, 
presume reliance from the simple fact that it asked the question.  
But there may be situations where courts should presume such 
reliance. For instance, if a shipowner requires a prospective 
applicant to submit to a physical examination and/or to fill out 
a detailed medical history form, the extent to which the employer 
will be required to submit affirmative proof of reliance should 
be diminished.  It is not that reliance is no longer required; 
rather, it is that the employer will there have demonstrated 
reliance by adopting a particular procedure or form.  However, 
where, as here, a general question about past illnesses and 
injuries is but a single question in a standard form employment 
application, the situation is markedly different.  The question 
is simply one of many questions on a variety of topics, and the 
rather vague inquiry into medical history may not ever be 
reviewed by anyone at all.  The employer's interest in the 
information is significantly less than in the prior examples, and 
it therefore makes sense to require the shipowner to present 
evidence of reliance. 
14
    Although lost wages are qualitatively different from 
damages for pain and suffering as the former would certainly be 
deemed an incident of the seaman's contract of employment, for 
purposes of our discussion, we will accept McCormack's conflation 
of these damages. 
  
the trial, the nature of the two causes of action, and the law of 
the case precludes recovery for these damages under general 
maritime law.  See Brief of Appellant at 13.  
 In Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367 
(1932), the Supreme Court discussed the impact of the then 
recently enacted Jones Act upon general maritime law.  The Court 
stated: 
    By the general maritime law, a seaman is 
without a remedy against the ship or her 
owners for injuries to his person, suffered 
in the line of service, with two exceptions 
only . . . .  A remedy is his also if the 
injury has been suffered through breach of 
the duty to provide him with "maintenance and 
cure."  The duty to make such provision is 
imposed by the law itself as one annexed to 
the employment.  The Osceola, supra.  
Contractual it is in the sense that it has 
its source in a relation which is contractual 
in origin, but, given the relation, no 
agreement is competent to abrogate the 
incident.  If the failure to give maintenance 
or cure has caused or aggravated an illness, 
the seaman has his right of action for injury 
thus done to him; the recovery in such 
circumstances including not only necessary 
expenses, but also compensation for the hurt.  
The Iroquois, 194 U.S. 240 . . . .  
    The question then is to what extent the 
ancient rule has been changed by modern 
statute . . . commonly known as the Jones Act 
. . . .  We are to determine whether death 
resulting from the negligent omission to 
furnish care or cure is death from personal 
injury within the meaning of the statute. 
    We think the origin of the duty is 
consistent with a remedy in tort, since the 
wrong, if a violation of a contract, is also 
something more.  The duty, as already pointed 
out, is one annexed by the law to a relation 
and annexed as an inseparable incident 
without heed to any expression of the will of 
  
the contracting parties.  For breach of a 
duty thus imposed, the remedy upon the 
contract does not exclude an alternative 
remedy built upon the tort. 
 
Id. at 370-72.  Several courts have since cited Cortes for the 
proposition that an employee may recover damages resulting from 
an employer's failure to provide maintenance and cure.  See e.g. 
Vaughn v. N.J. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530 (1962); Murphy v. 
Light, 257 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 1958); Sims v. United States 
of America War Shipping Admin., 186 F.2d 972, 974 (3d Cir. 1951). 
 In Sims, the district court disallowed a claim for 
additional damages in an action for maintenance and cure that a 
seaman brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 
741 et. seq.15  In reversing we stated: 
    The new question in this case is whether 
the respondent is liable for the 
                     
15
  The Suits in Admiralty Act waives the government's sovereign 
immunity: 
 
 [i]n cases where if [a United States] vessel were 
privately owned or operated, or if [United States] 
cargo were privately owned or possessed, or if a 
private person or property were involved, a proceeding 
in admiralty could be maintained, any appropriate 
nonjury proceeding in personam may be brought against 
the United States . . . . 
 
Gordon v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., 835 F.2d 96, 98 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988) (citing 46 U.S.C. § 742 
(1982)). 
 In effect, the Suits in Admiralty Act is a jurisdictional 
statute providing for maintenance of admiralty suits against the 
United States which encompasses all maritime torts alleged 
against the United States.  See id. at 98; United States v. 
Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 176 n.14 (1976).    
  
consequential damages16 occasioned by the 
failure to provide for maintenance and cure 
after termination of the voyage when it was 
demanded . . . .  
    We may regard it as settled law that if a 
man is injured or becomes ill while on a 
voyage, neglect to fulfill the duty to 
provide maintenance and cure may impose 
damages beyond mere cost of food and 
medicines.  The Iroquois, 194 U.S. 240, 24 
S.Ct. 640, 48 L.Ed. 955 . . . .17 
                     
16
  While the district court correctly classified Deisler's lost 
wages and damages for his pain and suffering as compensatory 
damages, an award of consequential damages would clearly 
encompass these compensatory damages.  Compensatory damages serve 
to compensate for harm sustained by a party.  Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 903 (1977).  Consequential damages are merely 
compensatory damages for harm that "does not flow directly and 
immediately from the act of a party, but only some of the 
consequences or results of such act."  Black's Law Dictionary 390 
(6th ed. 1990).       
17
  The Iroquois, 194 U.S. 240 (1904), first recognized the 
principle that the shipowner can be held liable for the damages 
resulting from neglect in the fulfillment of the duty to provide 
maintenance and cure.  There, plaintiff seaman sued the vessel in 
rem to recover damages resulting from the master's failure to 
provide him surgical treatment and care.  The seaman fractured 
two ribs and his right leg when he accidentally fell from the 
main yard to the deck of the vessel.  The master, with the aid of 
the carpenter, set the leg in splints for five weeks, after which 
the master found the leg to be in good condition and permitted 
the seaman to walk about with the aid of a crutch.  However, 
after arriving at port it was found the bones of his leg were not 
united and as a result his leg had to be amputated.  Id. at 240-
241.  In his suit, the seaman alleged that the master breached 
the duty owed to him in failing to put into an intermediate port 
and procure the proper surgical attention.  The district court 
entered a $3,000 judgment for the seaman which the court of 
appeals subsequently affirmed.   
 On appeal, the Supreme Court first noted that it had 
recently recognized the shipowner's duty to provide proper 
medical treatment for a seaman who becomes ill or injured in The 
Osceola.  The Court ultimately held that the master had breached 
his duty to the seaman by failing to put into an intermediate 
port sooner.  The Court further held that the fact that the 
seaman did not request to be taken to an intermediate port was of 
  
 
    This Court has held that it is not enough 
to give a sick man a hospital ticket.  If he 
is ill and penniless transportation to the 
place of treatment must be provided . . . . 
 
Sims, 186 F.2d at 973-74.  This obligation is inherent in the 
seaman's employment, but it is not limited by traditional 
concepts of contract.  
    This obligation for maintenance and cure is 
. . . "imposed by the law itself as one 
annexed to the employment . . . .  The duty . 
. . is one annexed by law to a relation, and 
annexed as an inseparable incident without 
heed to any expression of the will of the 
contracting parties."  Cortes v. Baltimore 
Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1932).  
It is no more a contract than the obligation 
of a husband to support his wife is one of 
contract.  Each arises out of a relationship 
voluntarily entered into.  But these duties 
are imposed by the law as an incident to the 
relationship, not a matter of contract. . . . 
[T]herefore, . . . the usual rules of damages 
for breach of contract to pay money are [not] 
applicable. (emphasis added).18  
(..continued) 
no significance because the master was his legal guardian and had 
a duty to look out for the safety and care of his seamen, whether 
or not such a request was made.  Id. at 247.   
18
   We have, however, limited the right to recover additional 
damages when one is not injured on the open sea.  See Graham v. 
Alcoa S.S. Co., Inc., 201 F.2d 423, 425 (3d Cir, 1953) ("This is 
not an action for failure to give proper medical care aboard 
ship, however, so that the Iroquois and Cortes cases are not 
precisely apposite.  Plaintiff must sink or swim with the Sims 
case.").  Graham reasoned that consequential damages would not be 
allowed where the injury did not occur at open sea unless the 
sailor first informed the employer of the injury and requested 
maintenance and cure.  Here, as in Sims, Deisler did just that.  
"In Sims, . . . we held the defendant liable for its failure to 
supply maintenance and cure, but we limited liability to damages 
for those consequences occurring after notice of defendant for 
libellant's need of care and of his inability to procure it 
  
 
Id. at 974.  Although the court's analogy to the marital 
relationship can not withstand the social evolution that has 
occurred since the court spoke, the court's pronouncement of the 
permissible recovery for failure to promptly provide maintenance 
and cure remains valid.  See also Neville v. American Barge Line 
Co., 276 F.2d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 1960).  There, a prior suit had 
established that the plaintiff was entitled to maintenance and 
cure up until December 4, 1951, and that plaintiff had not yet 
reached the point of maximum cure.  Id. at 118-19.  Thereafter, 
plaintiff instituted a second suit because no money had been paid 
for maintenance and cure after December 4, 1951.  In the second 
action, plaintiff sought maintenance and cure, along with lost 
wages and damages for pain and suffering.  Id. at 119.  The claim 
for consequential damages was based upon plaintiff's assertion 
that the failure to provide maintenance and cure prevented her 
from obtaining psychiatric treatment, and had thus caused 
additional suffering and loss of earnings.  Id. at 120.  A jury 
awarded plaintiff maintenance and cure and lost wages as well as 
damages for the pain and suffering that resulted from withholding 
maintenance and cure.  We reversed the award of consequential 
damages because of insufficient proof of causation.  However, we 
(..continued) 
because of indigence."  Id. at 425.  Here, the district court 
concluded that Deisler's pain and suffering resulted from his 




expressly reaffirmed the principle that consequential damages are 
recoverable for the wrongful failure to provide maintenance and 
cure.  Id. (citing Sims, 186 F.2d at 975).  The claim in Neville 
was brought under general maritime law.  Thus, consequential 
damages for failure to pay maintenance and cure are not limited 
to claims under the Jones Act.  This is consistent with the 
Supreme Court's decisions in Cortes and Vaughn, supra. 
     In Vaughn, plaintiff seaman had worked as a taxi driver 
after becoming ill while in defendant's employ.  The employer 
refused to pay maintenance and cure because it doubted that 
plaintiff had really been ill.  "Ultimately [the employee] was 
required to hire an attorney and sue in the courts to recover 
maintenance and cure, agreeing to pay the lawyer a 50% contingent 
fee."  Vaughn, 369 U.S. at 529.  The district court granted 
maintenance and cure but ordered that the amount plaintiff had 
earned as a taxi driver be deducted from the recovery.  The court 
further limited recovery to damages directly relating to the 
employer's obligation to provide medical treatment for the 
sailor.  The court reasoned that plaintiff was not entitled to 
attorney's fees, and could only recover damages which resulted 
"when the failure to furnish maintenance and cure caused or 
aggravated the illness or other physical or mental suffering."  
Id.  The court of appeals also denied counsel fees reasoning that 
they are not recoverable in suits for breach of contract. 
  
 The Supreme Court disagreed on both points.  The Court 
reasoned that "[w]hile failure to give maintenance and cure may 
give rise to a claim for damages for the suffering and for the 
physical handicap which follows (The Iroquois, 194 U.S. 240, 24 
S.Ct. 640, 48 L.Ed. 955), the recovery may also include 
'necessary expenses.' Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 
367, 371, 53 S.Ct. 173, 174, 77 L.Ed. 368."  Id. at 530.  The 
Court reasoned that the shipowner's duty to provide maintenance 
and cure "was among 'the most pervasive' of all and . . . not to 
be defeated by restrictive distinctions nor 'narrowly confined.'  
When there are ambiguities or doubts, they are resolved in favor 
of the seaman." Id. at 532 (citations omitted).  The Court also 
rejected the ruling that wages earned as a cab driver should be 
deducted from any recovery.  
  It would be a sorry day for seamen if 
shipowners, knowing of the claim for 
maintenance and cure, could disregard it, 
force the disabled seaman to work, and then 
evade part or all of their legal obligation 
by having it reduced by the amount of the 
sick man's earnings . . . .  This result is 
at war with the liberal attitude that 
heretofore has obtained and with admiralty's 
tender regard for seamen. 
 
Id. at 533 (citing Yates v. Dann, 223 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1955)) 
(if seaman is found to be still in need of maintenance and cure 
the fact that the seaman is forced by financial necessity to 
return to his regular employment will not serve as a bar to his 
recovery).   
  
 We therefore disagree with McCormack's assertion that the 
additional damages that Deisler seeks are limited to the Jones 
Act.  Brief of Appellant at 13-14.  We believe that the district 
court properly awarded Deisler lost wages, damages for pain and 
suffering, and prejudgment interest arising from McCormack's 
failure to pay him maintenance and cure. 
 McCormack further asserts that even where such additional 
damages and expenses are awarded on a maintenance and cure claim, 
they are allowed only where there is a willful and wrongful 
refusal to pay maintenance and cure and that the record here does 
not support the district court's conclusion that McCormack's 
refusal to pay maintenance and cure was arbitrary or capricious. 
As noted above, in Sims we held that consequential damages are 
allowed in a claim for maintenance and cure in order to make the 
injured seaman whole, and they are not dependent upon a showing 
of bad faith.  See Sims, 186 F.2d at 974.  That holding was based 
upon the analogous situation in tort law: 
 
  One man hurts another in an accident.  The 
actor fails to provide medical care or 
alleviate the harm suffered by the victim 
honestly thinking that he was not (1) himself 
negligent or (2) the victim was 
contributorily negligent.  If the trier of 
fact disagrees with the actor on these 
conclusions, defendant is liable for full 
damages suffered, although some of them could 
have been mitigated by prompt action on his 
part.   
 
Id. at 974-75. 
  
 In Morales v. Garijak, 829 F.2d 1355, 1358 (5th Cir. 1987), 
the court suggests that compensatory damages may not be recovered 
unless the shipowner's refusal is unreasonable.  However, we do 
not need to address the specifics of this argument as this record 
clearly supports a finding that McCormack's refusal was not 
reasonable. 
  From the outset, the only reason offered for McCormack's 
failure to pay maintenance and cure was the assertion that no 
accident had occurred.  During the trial, the district court 
questioned Bernard Lillis, McCormack's Chief Financial Officer, 
about McCormack's reason for denying Deisler's claim: 
  Lillis: If one person had come along and said 
that they saw Mr. Deisler fall over the 
wheelbarrow I would have changed my decision. 
  . . . 
  The Court: Mr. Lillis has made it very clear 
that the reason maintenance and cure was 
denied was because he didn't think the 
accident ever happened.  Isn't that right, 
Mr. Lillis? 
  Mr. Lillis: That's right, your honor. 
  . . . 
  The Court: Let me pursue this.  Is it your 
position that the only reason that 
maintenance and cure was denied was because 
your company felt that an accident never 
happened? 
  Mr. Lillis: That is true, your honor. 
  The Court: An accident of Mr. Deisler falling 
over a wheelbarrow on June 15, 1989? 
  Mr. Lillis: That's correct. 
  The Court: That is it? 
  Mr. Lillis: That is it. 
 
(emphasis added).  Findings of Fact, ¶ 49 n.5, Suppl. App. at 45-
46. 
  
 However, McCormack never interviewed Deisler, and although 
Melendez denied seeing Deisler fall he told Lamorte's 
investigator that he saw Deisler "dusting himself off" after the 
wheelbarrow incident.  Suppl. App. at 169.  In addition, Ellis 
told Lamorte's investigator that he saw "the wheel barrow lying 
on its side, the bags on the ground, and Deisler standing there 
kicking his feet."  Id.  Rather than accept that testimony as 
corroboration that Deisler had been injured, McCormack 
tenaciously used it to support the rather dubious position that 
no accident could have occurred because no one saw it.  Finally, 
McCormack disregarded their own investigators' recommendations 
that they pay Deisler maintenance and cure.  Although McCormack 
was under no obligation to accept the recommendations of Lamorte 
or American Maritime, the district court did not have to ignore 
McCormack's rejection of its own expert's recommendation. 
 Similarly, the district court properly noted that 
McCormack's reason for denying Deisler's claim shifted from 
pillar to post as the case progressed.  
  Defendant's primary defense to the 
maintenance and cure claim was that plaintiff 
lied about an accident occurring.  Second, 
defendant contended that no injury occurred 
even if the incident did.  Third, defendant 
contended that if plaintiff was suffering 
from any condition, which it denied, it pre-
existed the date of the incident.  Next, 
defendant contended that even if an injury 
occurred, it was fully resolved, and no 
further medical care was necessary.  Thus, 
the presentation of plaintiff and Steve 
Melendez as liability witnesses was 
necessary.  Plaintiff was required to move 
  
for a new Jones Act trial because of 
defendant's misrepresentations of material 
facts. 
 
Findings of Fact, ¶ 59.  That assessment is supported by the 
record.   
 It is now for McCormack, not Deisler, to bear the extra cost 
occasioned by McCormack's intransigence.  This includes the wages 
Deisler would have been earning had McCormack met its obligation 
to finance the corrective back surgery, and damages for the pain 
and suffering he has endured while awaiting that surgery.  See 
Cortes, supra.   
  
 1. The Law of the Case 
 Nor does the law of the case preclude Deisler from 
recovering consequential damages under general maritime law 
despite the jury's Jones Act verdict in favor of defendants.  
"The doctrine of the law of the case dictates that 'when a court 
decides upon a rule of law, that rule should continue to govern 
the same issues in subsequent stages in the litigation.'"  In re 
Resyn Corp., 945 F.2d 1279, 1281 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Devex 
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 857 F.2d 197, 199 (3d Cir. 1988)); 
see also Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)19; 
Schultz v. Onan Corp., 737 F.2d 339, 345 (3d Cir. 1984) (the law 
of the case doctrine applies "to issues that were actually 
discussed by the court in the prior appeal [and] to issues 
decided by necessary implication.").  While the doctrine most 
commonly serves to bar litigants from rearguing issues previously 
decided on appeal, see CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Northbrook Excess & 
Surplus Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 1211, 1215 (1st Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 150 (1st Cir. 1991); 
Schultz, 737 F.2d at 345, we have held that the dismissal of an 
appeal terminates the cause of action and the judgment of the 
district court becomes the law of the case.  See Hook v. Hook & 
Ackerman, 233 F.2d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 1956).20      
                     
19
   "Unlike the more precise requirements of res judicata, law 
of the case is an amorphous concept."  460 U.S. at 618.  
20
     The "[l]aw of the case directs a court's discretion, it 
does not limit the tribunal's power."  Schultz, 737 F.2d at 345 
(citations omitted).  
  
 McCormack argues that since Deisler elected to dismiss the 
Jones Act claim after trial the law of the case precludes 
recovery of consequential damages under general maritime law.  
That argument rests upon the mistaken belief that such lost wages 
and damages for pain and suffering are incidents of negligence 
under the Jones Act and not recoverable under the general 
maritime law.  As we explained above, such damages may be 
recovered for the failure to provide maintenance and cure in the 
absence of a Jones Act claim.  Thus, the law of the case is not a 
bar to plaintiff's recovery. 
 2. Prejudgment Interest. 
 The award of prejudgment interest was also proper.  Unlike 
attorney's fees and litigation expenses (which were not regarded 
as part of the merits of judgment at common law) prejudgment 
interest has traditionally been considered part of the 
compensation due to a plaintiff.  See Osterneck v. Ernst & 
Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 175 (1989).  The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that prejudgment interest is merely an element of 
a plaintiff's complete compensation.  See id.; West Virginia v. 
United States, 479 U.S. 305, 310, & n.2 (1987).  Interest must be 
allowed if plaintiff is to be truly made whole for defendant's 
breach of its duty to provide maintenance and cure.  See Vaughn, 
supra. 
 3. Attorney's Fees and Costs. 
  
 Attorney's fees and costs differ from interest, lost wages 
and damages for pain and suffering because attorney's fees and 
costs cannot be recovered unless plaintiff can first establish 
defendant's bad faith or recalcitrance.  
  Recognizing the importance of a seaman's 
right to be made whole through the recovery 
of maintenance and cure, the federal courts 
have fashioned a supplemental remedy for 
instances in which a ship operator's 
unjustified refusal to own up to its 
responsibilities to furnish maintenance and 
cure forces a seaman to incur the expense of 
a lawsuit to collect that which is due.  When 
a ship operator fails to make a prompt, good 
faith investigation of a seaman's claim for 
maintenance and cure or otherwise takes a 
"callous" or "recalcitrant" view of its 
obligations, the seaman may recover legal 
expenses on top of maintenance and cure. See 
Vaughn, 369 U.S. at 530-531 . . . .  
 
Rodriguez Alvarez v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 898 F.2d 312, 316 
(2d Cir. 1990). 
 However, as stated above, the record here fully supports the 
district court's conclusion that McCormack's refusal to pay 
Deisler maintenance and cure was arbitrary and capricious. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's award of 
attorney's fees and costs. 
 C. Allocation of Fees and Costs 
 Alternatively, McCormack argues that even if the award of 
attorney's fees and costs was proper, the district court acted 
arbitrarily in allocating 90% of plaintiff's attorney's fees to 
the general maritime claim and refusing to make an allocation of 
  
costs between it and the Jones Act claims.  The district court 
candidly acknowledged that "[g]iven the overlapping evidence on 
the Jones Act claim and the maintenance and cure claim, it is 
difficult to separate out services attributable solely to the 
unsuccessful Jones Act claim."  Findings of Fact, ¶ 59.  
Notwithstanding this caveat, the court held that based on its 
"review of the record a fair estimate of counsel time expended in 
attempting to prove defendant's negligence under the Jones Act is 
10%."  Id.   
 The district court must exercise its informed discretion in 
awarding attorney's fees.  Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 713 F.2d 972, 
977 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984) (citation 
omitted).  Thus, our standard of review is a narrow one.  "We can 
find an abuse of discretion if no reasonable [person] would adopt 
the district court's view.  If reasonable [people] could differ 
as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then 
it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion."  
Silberman v. Bogle, 683 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1982) (citation 
omitted).    
 McCormack argues only that "[i]t is inconceivable that only 
10% of fees are attributable to the Jones Act jury trial, in 
which plaintiff unsuccessfully tried many issues not implicated 
in the maintenance and cure claim."  Presented with no more than 
this assertion of "inconceivability," we cannot say that the 
division of attorney's fees was an abuse of discretion.  Although 
  
the required division of fees is difficult, our review of the 
record does not allow us to conclude that the district court 
erred in slicing the pie as it did.  Accordingly, we will affirm 
the district court's allocation of the award of attorney's fees 
and costs. 
  D. The Deposition of Charles Ellis             
 
 McCormack argues that it should have been allowed to 
introduce the deposition of Captain Ellis under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 32(a)(3) as Ellis was more than 100 miles from 
the place of trial, was no longer McCormack's employee, and thus 
was unavailable within the meaning of that Rule.  The district 
court did not allow McCormack to use Ellis' deposition because it 
found that Deisler took the deposition under the misapprehension 
that Ellis had not witnessed any part of Deisler's accident.  The 
court reasoned that Deisler was therefore unlikely to have 
focused upon Ellis' observations during the deposition.  
  Plaintiff's counsel's strategy during the 
Ellis deposition was to avoid creating a 
deposition record which could be used against 
his client at trial in the event of Ellis's 
unavailability at trial.  This strategy is a 
plausible response to defendant's misleading 
answer to the interrogatory in question. 
 
Findings of Fact, ¶ 12 n.2.   
 Even assuming the district court erred in excluding the 
deposition, we believe that any error in this regard was 
harmless.  See McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 
923-28 (3d Cir. 1985) (errors are harmless if it is highly 
  
probable a party's substantial rights were not affected).  The 
excluded testimony adds little that is not contained in the 
Lamorte report which the district court did consider.  Ellis 
testified at the deposition that Deisler told him that he 
(Deisler) was not helping to off-load a cable from the bow of the 
dredge because he had a bad back.  App. at 193.  The Lamorte 
report states that after Ellis asked Deisler to help move some 
cables Deisler informed Ellis of his bad back, but did not blame 
it on any mishap with a wheelbarrow.  Suppl. App. at 169.  
Secondly, Ellis testified at the deposition that he saw Deisler 
pushing the "wheelbarrow" but did not watch him perform the whole 
job.  App. at 195.  Similarly, the Lamorte report states that 
Ellis only saw "the wheelbarrow lying on its side, the bags lying 
on the ground, and Deisler standing there kicking his feet."  
Suppl. App. at 169.  Finally, both the Lamorte report and the 
deposition transcript state that Ellis did not learn of Deisler's 
injury until after Deisler was fired.  Suppl. App. at 168; App. 
at 197. 
 Thus, any error in failing to admit Ellis' deposition was 
harmless as the district court considered the same testimony by 
way of the Lamorte report. 
     E. Challenges to the District Court's Findings of Fact 
 McCormack also challenges a series of factual findings, all 
of which are supported by the record.  We therefore find these 
  
challenges to the district court's findings of fact to be lacking 
in merit. 
  First, McCormack claims that the district court erred in 
finding that plaintiff suffered a job related injury because the 
finding was based upon an erroneous belief that Ellis had 
witnessed the accident.  There is ample evidence to support the 
district court's finding that Ellis witnessed the accident.  
Melendez testified that Ellis observed the event and exclaimed: 
"Oh, look, he fell. He busted his a...," as he watched.  In 
addition, both Deisler and Melendez testified that the accident 
occurred. 
   Second, McCormack claims that the district court erred in 
finding that plaintiff's accident and his reports of it occurred 
before plaintiff was notified that he had been fired.  Deisler 
testified that he reported the accident to both Melendez and 
Ellis before he was fired and that he was filling out the 
accident report when he was given his dismissal notice.  Melendez 
corroborated part of that testimony.  There was testimony that  
Deisler completed the accident report on June 16, and thereafter 
had his own doctor fill out and return a New Jersey Disability 
Form. 
 McCormack also argues that the testimony of Brad Simek and 
William Daniel contradict the district court's findings.  Simek 
inferred no accident had occurred because any accident should 
have been reported to him, and none was.  Daniel testified that 
  
Deisler reported the accident to him after Deisler had been 
terminated.  Regardless of when, if ever, Deisler told Simek or 
Daniel of his accident, the evidence that Deisler told Ellis and 
Melendez of his injury prior to being terminated supports the 
district court's finding.  
 Third, McCormack argues that the district court erred in 
finding that the investigation of Deisler's claim was not 
conducted in good faith.  McCormack claims that the court based 
this finding upon an equally erroneous finding -- namely, that 
the only reason McCormack did not pay maintenance and cure was 
that it believed that no accident occurred and that the medical 
evidence supporting Deisler's claim was ignored.  
 We previously detailed the abundance of evidence supporting 
the district court's finding that McCormack did not rely on 
Deisler's pre-existing medical condition either in hiring him or 
in its decision not to pay maintenance and cure.  Moreover, the 
record supports a finding that all of the evidence which tended 
to corroborate Deisler's claim was ignored by McCormack. 
 Finally, McCormack argues that the district court erred in 
finding that Deisler will reach maximum medical improvement 
approximately four months after surgery.  McCormack claims that 
Deisler admitted in his trial testimony that his doctors told him 
toward the end of 1989 that his medical condition would not 
improve.  Brief of Appellant at 25.  McCormack claims that the 
end of 1989, rather than four months after surgery, is the point 
  
of "maximum cure."  However, McCormack's position is based upon 
an incomplete recitation of Deisler's testimony.  Deisler 
testified that his doctors told him his condition would not 
improve without surgery.21  
 III. CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons stated above we find that McCormack's 
arguments are without merit.  Accordingly, the judgment of the 
district court will be affirmed.22   
                     
21
   Defendants failed to include the following testimony in 
their brief:  
  Q. Did Dr. Molzen tell you that surgery 
would improve your  condition? 
  A. That is a tricky question.  Dr. Molzen 
recommended surgery for me, yes.  Yes, it 
would improve my condition.  There is also a 
threat that it will not be successful, but 
yes it would help. 
  Q. Dr. Gott, did he tell you that surgery 
would improve your condition? 
  A. Yes, he did. 
  Q. But they also told you that there were risks  
  involved. 
  A. Absolutely. 
  Q. Is that why you hesitated? 
  A. Yes. 
Suppl. App. at 20. 
22
   We will also grant Deisler's motion for reimbursement of the 
costs associated with Deisler's submission of a Supplemental 
Appendix.  The Appendix filed by McCormack was inadequate and the 
editing of the testimony of Melendez and Deisler was so selective 
as to be misleading. Deisler therefore had to file the 
Supplemental Appendix to clarify the record.  
 
 
